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█ Abstract In this paper, we want to support Kriegel’s argument in favor of the thesis that there is a cogni-
tive form of phenomenology that is both irreducible to and independent of any sensory form of phenom-
enology by providing another argument in favor of the same thesis. Indeed, this new argument is also in-
tended to show that the thought experiment Kriegel’s argument relies on does describe a genuine meta-
physical possibility. In our view, Kriegel has not entirely succeeded in showing that his own argument dis-
plays that possibility. We present our argument in two steps. First, we attempt to prove that there is a 
cognitive phenomenology that is irreducible to any form of sensory phenomenology. Our proof relies on a 
kind of phenomenal contrast argument that however does not appeal to introspection. Second, by show-
ing that the link between this form of cognitive phenomenology, the phenomenology of having thoughts, 
and sensory phenomenology in general is extrinsic, we also aim to demonstrate that the former is inde-
pendent of the latter. 
KEYWORDS: Cognitive Phenomenology; Irreduciblity; Independence; Having Thoughts; Grasping 
Thoughts 
 
█ Riassunto Un altro argomento in favore della fenomenologia cognitiva – In questo articolo intendiamo 
corroborare l’argomento di Kriegel in favore dell’esistenza di una forma cognitiva di fenomenologia irri-
ducibile a e indipendente da ogni altra forma di fenomenologia della sensibilità, avanzando un altro ar-
gomento a sostegno della stessa tesi. Nei fatti, questo nuovo argomento vuole anche mostrare che 
l’esperimento mentale su cui poggia l’argomento di Kriegel descrive effettivamente una genuina possibili-
tà metafisica; e tuttavia crediamo che l’argomento di Kriegel non abbia mostrato fino in fondo proprio 
questa possibilità. Vogliamo presentare il nostro argomento in due passi. In un primo momento, tentere-
mo di provare l’esistenza di una fenomenologia cognitiva irriducibile a ogni altra forma di fenomenologia 
sensoriale. La nostra prova poggia su un tipo di argomento basato su un contrasto fenomenico che non si 
appella all’introspezione. In un secondo momento, mostrando che il legame tra questa forma di fenome-
nologia cognitiva, ossia la fenomenologia del possesso dei pensieri, e la fenomenologia sensoriale è un le-
game estrinseco, intendiamo dimostrare che la prima è indipendente dalla seconda. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Fenomenologia cognitiva; Irriduciblità; Indipendenza; Possesso dei pensieri; Afferramen-
to dei pensieri 
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█  Introduction 
 
IN THIS PAPER, WE WANT to support 
Kriegel’s argument in favor of the thesis that 
there is a cognitive form of phenomenology 
that is both irreducible to and independent of 
any sensory form of phenomenology by 
providing another argument in favor of the 
same thesis. Indeed, this new argument is also 
intended to show that the thought experiment 
Kriegel’s argument relies on does describe a 
genuine metaphysical possibility. In our view, 
Kriegel has not entirely succeeded in showing 
that his own argument displays that possibil-
ity. We present our argument in two steps. 
First, we attempt to prove that there is a 
cognitive phenomenology that is irreducible 
to any form of sensory phenomenology. Our 
proof relies on a kind of phenomenal contrast 
argument that however does not appeal to in-
trospection. Second, by showing that the link 
between this form of cognitive phenomenolo-
gy, the phenomenology of having thoughts, 
and sensory phenomenology in general is ex-
trinsic, we also aim to demonstrate that the 
former is independent of the latter. 
 
█  No argument from interest 
 
In the opening part of The Varieties of Con-
sciousness,1 Kriegel argues in favor of cognitive 
phenomenology as a sui generis form of phe-
nomenology. As he claims, cognitive phenom-
enology is a form of phenomenology that is 
both irreducible to any other form of phe-
nomenology, primarily sensory phenomenol-
ogy, and independent of any such form.2 
Kriegel initially tries to convince us of his 
claim by an appeal to a «simple observation»: 
«if there were no cognitive phenomenology, 
life would be boring».3 To be sure, he adds that 
an argument may be unpacked from this sim-
ple observation, namely: 
 
1) If we did not have irreducible cognitive 
phenomenology, the contents of our phe-
nomenal awareness from phenomenal on-
set to sunset would not be disposed to elicit 
differential feelings of interest in us;  
 
but 
  
2)  they are so disposed; therefore,  
 
3) we do have irreducible cognitive phenom-
enology. 
 
Yet as he admits, the argument is less 
convincing than the very same observation. 
And pour cause. To illustrate this point more 
vividly, a libertine may find premise (1) ra-
ther controversial. She may remark that, 
even if she had no cognitive phenomenology, 
she might spend her life passing from one 
sexual adventure to another, simply finding 
each adventure distinctively attractive from a 
sensory point of view. No orgasm she would 
feel in any of these encounters would be ty-
pologically identical with any other one, she 
may crudely comment.  
However, cognitive life is indisputably in-
teresting in itself, so as to be worth experi-
encing even if one did not have a sensory 
phenomenology. Is there another way to ar-
gue in favor of this idea? 
 
█  The Zoe argument 
 
Kriegel claims that there is a way to argue 
that cognitive phenomenology is independ-
ent of sensory phenomenology. Since the in-
dependence claim entails the claim that cog-
nitive phenomenology is irreducible to sen-
sory phenomenology,4 to argue for the for-
mer is eo ipso to argue for the latter. 
In putting forward his new argument, 
Kriegel’s aim is to attempt to break the dead-
lock in the philosophical discussion on this 
topic. In fact, the position that claims that 
cognitive phenomenology is different from 
sensory phenomenology, the so-called liberal 
position,5 has been backed by several argu-
ments. Among these arguments, the phe-
nomenal contrast argument, the so-called 
Moore-Strawson argument,6 and the one 
from first-person knowability, the so-called 
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Goldman-Pitt argument,7 are the two main 
varieties. Although Kriegel admittedly en-
dorses both arguments, he claims that they 
suffer from a lack of elucidation of the target 
notions they involve, i.e., the notions of cog-
nitive and of phenomenal. His new argu-
ment’s starting point consists in precisely 
providing such an elucidation: «with the 
right characterization of the cognitive and 
the phenomenal […] one can start to imagine 
the kind of scenario whose possibility would 
establish the existence of primitive cognitive 
phenomenology».8 To be sure, Kriegel’s new 
argument is a phenomenal contrast argument 
(PCA). Yet unlike the standard arguments of 
this form, it does not rely on introspection, as 
we will see. Notoriously, appealing to intro-
spection is a doubtful move. 
Kriegel first asks us to imagine a sensory 
zombie, that is, someone who is devoid not 
only of any form of sensory phenomenology, 
both perceptual (linked to exteroceptive sen-
sations) and algedonic (linked to interocep-
tive and proprioceptive sensations; in order 
to take into account the fact that such a phe-
nomenology includes not only pains but also 
pleasures, one may perhaps better label it 
alg/hedonic), but also of any form of emo-
tional phenomenology, which is for Kriegel 
at the very least grounded in sensory phe-
nomenology. In order to imagine such a 
zombie, Zoe as Kriegel labels it, one may first 
imagine three partial zombies, that is, indi-
viduals who are respectively devoid of senso-
ry, alg/hedonic, and emotional phenomenol-
ogy, and second, one may fuse together such 
imaginations in the imagining of Zoe, who 
lacks all of these phenomenologies. Yet, con-
tinues Kriegel, Zoe’s life is not that bad as 
one might suspect. For, Kriegel stipulates, on 
the basis of some internal yet nonconscious 
processes that still happen to her in the sub-
personal perceptual, alg/hedonic and emo-
tional implementing areas of her brain, she 
still entertains an interesting cognitive life 
entirely devoted to thoughts concerning 
mathematical calculations. In such calcula-
tions, she inter alia realizes some important 
mathematical proofs. Any such realization 
involves a contrast in her cognitive life. He 
infers that such a contrast is phenomenal, 
thereby involving phenomenal mental states, 
simply by mobilizing his characterization of 
what is phenomenal, not by appealing to in-
trospection, as standard PCAs do.9 Since by 
assumption such mental states are not senso-
ry, it follows that they are endowed with a 
cognitive phenomenology. Thus, one may 
overall conclude that Zoe has a cognitive 
phenomenology while lacking a sensory one. 
As some people have remarked, the prob-
lem with this argument is that the fact that 
we can conceive of this previous story is no 
guarantee that the story amounts to a logical 
possibility. Indeed, we do not positively im-
agine this story.10 Granted, Kriegel is con-
vinced of the opposite, for the story betrays 
no trace of a contradiction.11  
Yet, his opponents may reply, even if this 
shows that the description of the story amounts 
to a positive form of imaginability and hence to 
a logical possibility, what reasons do we have to 
further endorse the claim that the story is also 
metaphysically possible? Is this a case for which 
being logically possible entails being metaphys-
ically possible? To this reply, Kriegel rejoins 
that «it is certainly highly plausible that some 
types of conceivability – including conceivabil-
ity by an epistemically responsible agent in 
normal or favorable circumstances – provide 
prima facie, defeasible evidence for metaphysi-
cal possibility»; Zoe’s case represents one of 
these types.12  
Yet can we content ourselves with the ab-
sence of any defeater? What if some defeater 
eventually pops up?13 In order to rule out 
such a possibility, we think it is useful to look 
for some other argument that strengthens 
Kriegel’s credence in what he calls «cogni-
tive-phenomenal primitivism»,14 thereby 
demonstrating that Zoe’s case is indeed a 
metaphysical possibility. In fact, we claim 
that there is such an argument. In the next 
Section, we tell another story which further 
suggests that there is no internal connection 
between cognitive and sensory phenomenol-
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ogy, thus demonstrating not only that the 
former is irreducible to the latter, but also 
that is independent of it. 
 
█  The Vita argument 
 
First, we focus on the most general phe-
nomenal contrast, the one between phenome-
nal life on the one hand, where what Kriegel 
calls «the highest phenomenal determinable» 
aka «phenomenality per se (what-it-is-like-ness 
as such)»15 is instantiated, and the absence of 
such a life, where no phenomenality at all oc-
curs. Needless to say, this amounts to the con-
trast between being awake and being asleep 
(allowing for the further assumption that no 
dreaming occurs while sleeping; from now on, 
let us take this specification for granted). Pass-
ing from being awake to being asleep is pre-
cisely switching from having phenomenality 
per se to having no such thing at all. 
This said, let us present a case that in-
volves such a contrast, the case of Vita. Vita 
is a chronic insomniac who uses all possible 
techniques to fall asleep. When she goes to 
bed she puts a black band over her eyes, she 
switches on a radio that continuously repeats 
the same sounds; she finds the most comfort-
able position to lie in; she covers herself with a 
very soft blanket so she will stay warm, and so 
on and so forth. In this condition, she manag-
es to keep her sensory phenomenology rela-
tively stable, so as to help her to fall asleep. In 
this way, she manages to relax: she feels no 
anxiety, fear or anger. Yet when it comes to 
falling asleep, no way. These practices not-
withstanding, she goes on thinking. Indeed, 
the reason why she does not fall asleep is pre-
cisely that she cannot stop thinking.  
This reason has nothing to do with any 
underlying processes in her body (her brain 
included), for example, not falling asleep be-
cause her heart is beating too fast. Such phys-
iological processes, if any, may cause her not 
to fall asleep, but they are not the reasons why 
the phenomenal switch from being awake to 
being asleep does not occur. Rather, that rea-
son has to do with the fact that she experienc-
es such thoughts, that they are conscious for 
her. Clearly enough, the reasons for her to 
entertain that sort of phenomenal switch 
have to be phenomenal as well. Indeed, she 
could continue to stay awake for a variety of 
phenomenally relevant reasons: e.g. because 
she was anxious, or suffered from a terrible 
itch, or even because she saw a ray of light. 
Yet, as we have seen before, it is not her sen-
sory phenomenology, as in all the above cas-
es, that is responsible for her not passing into 
another state where she lacks phenomenolo-
gy at all.  
Thus, another form of phenomenology 
must be responsible. The conscious thoughts she 
entertains over and above sensory phenome-
nology play this inhibitory role; her phenome-
nal life continues precisely because of them. 
To begin with, this argument is a form of 
PCA, for it involves considering a phenomenal 
switch from being awake to being asleep. How-
ever, it has some features of its own. For, unlike 
standard PCAs and like Kriegel’s Zoe argu-
ment, the point of the argument is not to focus 
on different phenomenal states whose phe-
nomenal difference is given introspectively. For 
there is no introspection as regards one’s being 
asleep – obviously enough, being asleep is not a 
mental state, hence a fortiori it cannot be some-
thing one is introspectively conscious of. Thus, 
it would be better to conceptualize the phe-
nomenal difference the story points out as a 
difference between the existence of phenome-
nal awareness on the one hand and the lack of 
such awareness on the other.16 
Moreover, it is hardly disputable that what 
the argument’s story describes is a metaphysical 
possibility: as a matter of fact, any of us may 
find her/himself in Vita’s state. Up to now, 
therefore, if we are right, we have managed to 
prove that there is a cognitive phenomenology 
that is irreducible to a sensory one. 
Obviously enough, detractors of the liber-
al view of cognitive phenomenology will im-
mediately protest that we have not proved 
the above claim. For, they would say, even if 
one concedes that Vita has a cognitive phe-
nomenology that exceeds her standard senso-
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ry phenomenology, that cognitive phenome-
nology may well be reduced to some other 
form of sensory phenomenology; namely, 
sensory imagery.17 In any such thoughts, Vita 
entertains some kind of sensory imagery, typi-
cally but not exclusively visual imagery. While 
thinking, say, of her work tomorrow, she has 
some flashes of the building where she works; 
while thinking of how to get to this building, 
she auditorily imagines the noise of the traffic 
around, and so on and so forth. 
Yet no such imagistic phenomenology can 
account for all the thoughts Vita entertains 
while lying in bed. As she is very ingenious, she 
has developed a technique for thinking boring, 
sleep-inducing, thoughts: typically, item-count-
ing thoughts. Yet instead of counting sheep as 
normal people do, Vita counts items featuring 
an even less exciting subject; namely, geomet-
rical figures. As you know, she is a terrible in-
somniac. So, her enumeration proceeds: after a 
while, she starts counting first a chiliagon then 
a circle. Yet as we all know, no sensory imagery 
distinguishes the thought of a chiliagon from 
the thought of a circle. Thus, this switching in 
Vita’s thoughts cannot be accounted for in 
terms of sensory imagery. 
Yeah, yeah – our detractor will say. Yet in 
counting geometrical figures, as in any other 
thought for that matter, Vita engages herself 
in some inner speech, which definitely has an 
aural counterpart. So, while counting a chili-
agon, Vita silently says to herself (and audito-
rily imagines herself saying) “This is a chili-
agon”, while counting a circle, Vita silently 
says to herself (and auditorily imagines herself 
saying) “This is a circle”, thereby letting her 
switch in thought be matched by a switch in 
(auditory) imagery that concerns the different 
phonology and possibly also the different syn-
tactical parsing of such sentences.18 
Yet even if this were the case, it is quite 
easy to figure out a continuation of the story 
where Vita exploits another technique: 
namely, obsessively repeating to herself in 
inner speech the very same sentence en-
dowed with both the same phonology and 
the same syntax, yet meaning it now one way, 
now another way. For instance, she repeats 
“Dionysius is Greek” sometimes meaning 
Dionysius the Elder, ruler of Syracuse, Sicily, 
in ancient times, at other times meaning Di-
onysius the Younger, son of the former.  
It is quite possible that in her mind, not 
only she does not visually distinguish the two 
men, with whom obviously she has never had 
any physical contact – she sticks to the very 
same mental image of a distinguished ancient 
adult Greek – but she also does not aurally 
distinguish the different yet both phonetically 
and syntactically alike tokens of the above 
sentence.19 Thus, the thought switching that 
she repeatedly entertains cannot be accounted 
for by any sort of sensory imagery. As Witt-
genstein once masterly said in his own way: 
 
When someone says the word “cube” to 
me, for example, I know what it means. 
But can the whole use of the word come 
before my mind when I understand it in 
this way? 
Yes; but on the other hand, isn’t the mean-
ing of the word also determined by this 
use? And can these ways of determining 
meaning conflict? Can what we grasp at a 
stroke agree with a use, fit or fail to fit it? 
And how can what is present to us in an in-
stant, what comes before our mind in an 
instant, fit a use? 
What really comes before our mind when 
we understand a word? – Isn’t it some-
thing like a picture? Can’t it be a picture? 
Well, suppose that a picture does come be-
fore your mind when you hear the word 
“cube”, say the drawing of a cube. In what 
way can this picture fit or fail to fit a use of 
the word “cube”? – Perhaps you say: “It’s 
quite simple; if that picture occurs to me 
and I point to a triangular prism for in-
stance, and say it is a cube, then this use of 
the word doesn’t fit the picture.” – But 
doesn’t it fit? I have purposely so chosen 
the example that it is quite easy to imagine 
a method of projection according to which 
the picture does fit after all. 
The picture of the cube did indeed suggest 
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a certain use to us, but it was also possible 
for me to use it differently.20 
 
Once we have so managed to show that 
cognitive phenomenology is irreducible to 
any sensory phenomenology, it is relatively 
simple to also show that the former is inde-
pendent of the latter, thereby also showing 
how Kriegel’s argument may be supported by 
our own argument.  
As is well known, the point of Wittgen-
stein’s previous remarks was that meaning 
something by means of an expression does 
not consist in any sort of mental process that 
at most accompanies meaning: 
 
Neither the expression “to mean the ex-
planation in such-and-such a way” nor the 
expression “to interpret the explanation 
in such-and-such a way” signifies a pro-
cess which accompanies the giving and 
hearing of an explanation.21 
 
Now, Vita’s case shows that the very same 
point can be made with regard to the relation-
ship between sensory and cognitive phenom-
enology, at least as far as the phenomenology 
of thought is concerned. Let us concede that 
any of Vita’s thoughts is accompanied by 
some sort of sensory phenomenology or other: 
in actual fact, there is no thought of Vita’s that 
is not accompanied by some phenomenal sen-
sory state or other, ultimately a sensory image-
ry of some form or other (visual, auditory, 
etc.). One might even wonder whether senso-
ry phenomenology necessitates cognitive phe-
nomenology, in Chudnoff’s terms: «some 
phenomenal states suffice for being in a cogni-
tive intentional state»,22 where this sufficiency 
condition is a factual one: actually, being in 
some sensory phenomenal state or other suf-
fices for being in a cognitive phenomenal 
state. Yet clearly enough, this relationship be-
tween the two kinds of phenomenologies is no 
more intimate than that of an accompanying 
or a surrounding. Yet this is to say, there is no 
intrinsic relationship between a cognitive form 
of phenomenology and a sensory form of 
phenomenology.  
In other terms, the cognitive phenomenol-
ogy of having thoughts is independent of any 
sensory phenomenology. There indeed is a 
possible world in which Vita still has the 
thoughts that prevent her from falling asleep 
and yet has no phenomenal sensory states at 
all – or in other terms, there is a possible world 
in which Vita is nothing but our old Zoe.23 
In order to further confirm that there is 
no intrinsic relationship between cognitive 
and sensory phenomenology, consider situa-
tions in which, unlike the previous one, irre-
ducibility of cognitive phenomenal states to 
sensory phenomenal states does not lead to 
the fact that the former states are independ-
ent of the latter states. There indeed is a dif-
ference between the phenomenology of hav-
ing thoughts, which is what we have talked 
about all along, and the phenomenology of 
grasping thoughts, namely that form of phe-
nomenology that paradigmatically takes 
place in experiences as of understanding, 
those originally pointed out by Strawson24 
among others. In such experiences, there def-
initely is a dependence of the cognitive phe-
nomenology of understanding on the sensory 
phenomenology of hearing or reading. One 
could not understand the thought that is ex-
pressed by a sentence that by itself is “dead”, 
i.e., meaningless, if one did not hear or read 
that very sentence, or even another such sen-
tence that is ascribed the very same meaning 
(for instance, a synonymous sentence in a 
different language). For understanding pre-
supposes interpretation of a meaningless sen-
tence that is heard or read as such, as ambig-
uous sentences clearly show.  
One could not understand the famous 
Wildean joke “To lose one parent, Mr. 
Worthing, may be regarded as a misfortune; to 
lose both looks like carelessness” if one did not 
first hear or read that sentence as a meaningless 
sentence by then interpreting it in the sense 
having to do with misplacing rather than in the 
sense having to do with suffering from depriva-
tion.25 Yet in having a thought, no such act of 
interpretation has to be presupposed. It is not 
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the case that one mentally hears or reads a cer-
tain sentence and then understands it by inter-
preting in a certain way, possibly choosing one 
among different theoretically legitimate inter-
pretations.26 Rather, one immediately thinks 
the thought in the only sense it has.  
Thus, even if some sentence or other im-
aginatively heard or read in inner speech 
pops up while having that thought, this sen-
tence only accompanies the thought in an ex-
trinsic sense: one might have thought that 
very thought without silently repeating to 
herself that sentence, or any other sentence 
for that matter.27 In a nutshell, the difference 
between the phenomenology of having 
thoughts and that of grasping thoughts ex-
plains why in the former the relationship be-
tween cognitive and sensory phenomenology 
is not the one holding in the latter; namely, it 
is an extrinsic and not an intrinsic one, 
thereby leading to the independence of the 
former from the latter.28 
Let us take stock. If we have managed to 
show that Zoe’s case really amounts to a met-
aphysical possibility by illustrating how the 
case of Vita, which undoubtedly is a meta-
physical possibility, may ultimately coincide 
with it, we have also managed to show that 
there is a form of cognitive phenomenology 
that is both irreducible to and independent 
of sensory phenomenology.29 
 
█  Notes 
 
1 See U. KRIEGEL, The Varieties of Consciousness, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford 2015. 
2 To put things in Chudnoff’s terms. See E. 
CHUDNOFF, Cognitive Phenomenology, Routledge, 
London 2015, pp. 15-17. To be sure, Kriegel lim-
its himself to saying that his arguments are in-
tended to prove the fact that cognitive phenome-
nology constitutes a primitive and distinctive 
form of phenomenology, hence that it is irreduci-
ble (in the phenomenal sense of irreducibility) to 
sensory phenomenology. Yet if successful, those 
arguments also show that there may be someone 
who entertains cognitive phenomenology without 
entertaining any sensory phenomenology. 
3 U. KRIEGEL, The Varieties of Consciousness, cit., 
 
 
p. 40. 
4 See E. CHUDNOFF, Cognitive Phenomenology, cit., 
p. 17. 
5 See T. BAYNE, M. MONTAGUE, Cognitive Phenome-
nology: An Introduction, in: T. BAYNE, M. MONTA-
GUE (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford 2011, pp. 1-34, here p. 3. 
6 See U. KRIEGEL, The Varieties of Consciousness, cit., 
p. 40. One can find the argument in G.E. MOORE, 
Propositions, in: G.E. MOORE, Some Main Problems of 
Philosophy, Routledge, London 1953, pp. 52-71, in 
particular pp. 58-59 and in G. STRAWSON, Mental 
Reality, MIT Press, Cambridge (MA) 1994, pp. 5-13. 
7 See ibidem. One can find the argument in A.I. 
GOLDMAN, The Psychology of Folk Psychology, in: 
«Behavioral and Brain Sciences», vol. XVI, n. 1, 
1993, pp. 15-28 and in D. PITT, The Phenomenol-
ogy of Cognition, or What Is It Like to Think that 
P?, in: «Philosophy and Phenomenological Re-
search», vol. LXIX, n. 1, 2004, pp. 1-36. 
8 Ivi, p. 41. 
9 See ivi, pp. 30-31. To be sure, in Chudnoff’s 
terms, unlike pure PCAs, Zoe’s argument is a hypo-
thetical PCA, that is, an argument in which the im-
agined case is not actual. See E. CHUDNOFF, Cogni-
tive Phenomenology, cit., pp. 45-55. Yet this does 
not undermine its non-introspective nature. 
10 See A. PAUTZ, Does Phenomenology Ground Men-
tal Content?, in: U. KRIEGEL (ed.), Phenomenal In-
tentionality, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013, 
pp. 194-234, in particular p. 219. For the notion of 
a positive imaginability and its link to logical (and 
also metaphysical) possibility, see originally D.J. 
CHALMERS, The Conscious Mind, Oxford Universi-
ty Press, Oxford 1996. 
11 See U. KRIEGEL, The Varieties of Consciousness, 
cit., p. 56. 
12 Ivi, p. 62. 
13 Chudnoff’s criticism may be taken to go along 
this direction. E. CHUDNOFF, Cognitive Phenome-
nology, cit., p. 54. 
14 U. KRIEGEL, The Varieties of Consciousness, cit., 
p. 38. 
15 Ivi, p. 10. 
16 In this respect, one might take our PCA as a form 
of what Chudnoff labels a glossed PCA, in whose 
premises one also glosses on the nature of the phe-
nomenal difference involved. See E. CHUDNOFF, 
Cognitive Phenomenology, cit., pp. 55-60. 
17 See J. PRINZ, The Sensory Basis of Cognitive Phe-
nomenology 1, in: T. BAYNE, M. MONTAGUE (eds.), 
Cognitive Phenomenology, cit., pp. 174-196, here 
 
Another Argument for Cognitive Phenomenology  
 
263 
 
pp. 181-193. 
18 See ivi; M. TYE, B. WRIGHT, Is There a Phenome-
nology of Thought?, in: T. BAYNE, M. MONTAGUE 
(eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology, cit., pp. 326-344. 
19 For similar examples, see e.g. C. SIEWERT, The 
Significance of Consciousness, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton 1998. 
20 L. WITTGENSTEIN, Philosophical Investigations 
(1953), Blackwell, Oxford 2009, IV ed., I, § 139. 
21 Ivi, I, § 34. 
22 E. CHUDNOFF, Cognitive Phenomenology, cit., p. 
133. 
23 Accepting this claim means accepting what 
Chudnoff labels the Disembodied Qualia Premise: 
«if there are cognitive phenomenal states, then 
there should be parts of phenomenally different 
total phenomenal states T1 and T2 such that:  
T1 includes both sensory and cognitive states and 
T2 is the same as T1 with respect to cognitive phe-
nomenal states but lacks all sensory phenomenal 
state» (E.  CHUDNOFF, Cognitive Phenomenology, 
cit., p. 118). 
24 See G. STRAWSON, Mental Reality, cit. 
25 It may then be the case that also in the other 
two cases that Chudnoff points out, namely: 
grasping a mathematical proof that uses a dia-
gram and intuiting a mathematical proof by visu-
alizing a shape, cognitive phenomenology is 
grounded in sensory phenomenology. For both 
such cases are cases in which one perceives some-
thing meaningless and then ascribes an interpre-
tation to it. See E. CHUDNOFF, Cognitive Phenom- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
enology, cit., p. 107. 
26 Perhaps interpreting that sentence amounts to 
matching it with a Mentalese sentence in the brain, 
Fodorians say. Yet the Mentalese sentence is not a 
meaningless sentence that is first (imaginatively) 
sensed as such and then interpreted in some way or 
other, for it is an originally meaningful sentence. 
Thus, if it is a vehicle of thinking, it is not so in the 
same way as a meaningless sentence is a vehicle of 
understanding. 
27 Chudnoff acknowledges that there may be cases 
of thoughts endowed only with cognitive phenome-
nology. Yet by echoing Prinz (see J. PRINZ, The Sen-
sory Basis of Cognitive Phenomenology 1, cit.), he 
wonders whether such cases are possible (see E. 
CHUDNOFF, Cognitive Phenomenology, cit., p. 108). If 
we are right in splitting these cases from cases of un-
derstanding in the above way, there is no problem in 
accepting their being genuinely possible. 
28 Thus, by drawing such a difference between 
these phenomenologies, with regards to the phe-
nomenology of having thoughts one may rebut 
the argument Chudnoff labels “the missing expla-
nation argument” that supposedly blocks the in-
ference from irreducibility of cognitive phenom-
enology to sensory phenomenology to independ-
ence of the former from the latter. See E. CHUD-
NOFF, Cognitive Phenomenology, cit., pp. 117-120. 
29 Although this paper was mutually conceived and 
discussed, Elisabetta Sacchi is particularly responsi-
ble for sections 1 and 3, while Alberto Voltolini is 
particularly responsible for sections 2 and 4. 
